Ros Monk, partner in our Land and Property Dispute Resolution team, explores a rare argument raised in the case of MVL Properties (2017) Limited v The Leadmill Limited [2025], where the tenant claimed that the landlord’s opposition to renewing the lease constituted a breach of human rights.
The facts
The Leadmill is an iconic venue located in Sheffield, known for its rich history in live music. Since its establishment in 1980, it has hosted performances by some of the UK’s most famous musicians from Oasis to Jorja Smith and welcomed Prince Charles and Princess Diana in 1988.
However, the Leadmill found itself in the headlines for a different reason when the landlord sought to terminate the lease of the operator.
The lease of The Leadmill was protected by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The landlord served a hostile Section 25 notice on the tenant seeking to terminate the lease based on ground (g) of Section 30 of the Act.
This ground allows a landlord to oppose renewal of a lease if the landlord can prove that it intends to occupy the property for their own business purposes. Here, the landlord stated that it intended to refurbish the property and then host and promote a range of live music, clubs and arts events at the property.
The tenant argued that 1) the landlord could not prove the necessary intention required by the 1954 Act and 2) Section 30 of the 1954 Act will not apply to a situation where a landlord intends to carry on essentially the same business as the tenant, as that would have the effect of appropriating the tenant’s goodwill in contravention of the tenant’s right to property under Article one of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The decision of the High Court
Had the landlord proved it had sufficient intention to satisfy the requirements of the 1954 Act?
Firstly, to recap on the legal position on intention:
- It is for the landlord to establish that it has the relevant intention to occupy the holding on the termination of the current tenancy and for the purposes of a business to be carried on therein by the landlord.
- That intention needs to be established at the date of the hearing.
- There are both subjective and objective elements to consider. Subjectively, the landlord needs to have a firm and settled intention. Objectively, there needs to be a reasonable prospect and a “real chance” of fulfilling that intention.
- The intention needs to be fulfilled within a reasonable time after the termination of the tenancy.
Here, the Court found for the landlord. The Court was satisfied that the landlord had proved both elements of intention. The sole director of the landlord company had given an undertaking to the Court. The landlord had also spent significant sums in relation to planning and design works and had obtained its own licence for the premises.
The Court was also satisfied that the landlord could afford the level of expenditure needed for the refurbishment. The Court dismissed the tenant’s argument that as it could render the premises a shell upon vacating, that the landlord’s works needed to include restoration.
The tenant argued that because the landlord would take time in undertaking the refurbishment works, this would mean it would not satisfy the requirements that it would occupy for the purpose of its business within a reasonable time after termination.
The Court rejected this argument, finding that occupying for the purpose of refurbishment or fit-out is occupation for the purpose of a business.
The Court found that the 35-week programme of works was not unreasonably long for this purpose.
Is this a breach of the tenant’s human rights?
The tenant argued that ground (g) must not be applied to a case where the landlord intends to carry on “essentially the same business” as the current tenant, since that would have the result of appropriating for himself the tenant’s goodwill that had become attached to the premises.
Previous caselaw had determined that “goodwill” can, in principle, constitute a “possession” within the Convention if it is an asset that holds monetary value. The tenant argued that allowing the landlord to succeed on ground (g) here would breach the tenant’s right to property under article one of the First Protocol.
The tenant argued that the compensation due under the 1954 Act would not be sufficient to compensate the tenant and the only sufficient protection would for the tenancy to continue.
The Court carefully considered the points and decided in this instance that the tenant had not established that it had goodwill.
Whilst it did not have to do so, the Court went on to consider whether the tenant had established goodwill, and whether it had been deprived of that possession by the termination of the tenancy.
Here, the Court first considered what is conferred by Article one of Protocol one, and it found that the Article did not confer a right of property but instead it guaranteed the peaceful enjoyment of possessions that someone already owns. It is for domestic law to define the nature and extent of any rights a person acquires from time to time.
Under domestic law the tenant did not have an unqualified right to continue to exploit the goodwill in the property. The 1954 Act gave the tenant the right to a new tenancy UNLESS the landlord could establish a ground of opposition, which it had done here.
For completeness, the Court considered that the provisions of the 1954 Act and in particular ground (g) and the five-year qualifying period and decided that they struck a fair balance between landlord and tenant.
In any event, the Court found that the landlord intended to conduct its own business from the property and was not carrying out effectively the same business as the tenant.
Therefore, the tenant failed on this ground as well.
Key takeaways
Firstly, in relation to the landlord’s intention, the finding that occupying for the purpose of refurbishment or fit out is occupation for the purpose of a business is useful clarification.
The finding that a 35-week programme of works was not unreasonably long for this purpose is useful practical guidance.
Secondly, in relation to human rights – this is a more unusual argument. It is normally seen as a last-ditch attempt argument.
As set out above, unsurprisingly the argument failed in the High Court and it is likely to be a difficult argument to ever succeed on in this context, even with a unique property like the Leadmill.
If you have any questions surrounding human rights issues, please contact our land and property dispute resolution team on 01772 258321.